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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff / Appellant:

Casey Florence is the Plaintiff / Appellant.

Tlii'uii^iiutil iln,, Ip111 1" tin1 rLiinlilV \ppellant is referred to as "Horence."

Defendant / Appellee:

Chad Colbert is the Defendant / Appellee.

Throughout this brief, the Respondent ! Appellant is referred to as "Colbert "
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal of the final ruling of the trial court, regarding the
interpretation of a contract. The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j), the case having been transferred to
the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A3-102(4).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE NO, 1:

Colbert restates Issue No. 1 as follows:

Issue No la: Whether the district court ruled and proceeded correctly in
determining that the Agreement is ambiguous, requiring the court to look to parol
evidence to determine the intent of the parties and the meaning of the Agreement.
"Whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law." Winegar v.
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). This court reviews "the trial court's
legal conclusions for correctness, granting [them] no particular deference." Covey v.
Covey, 80 P.3d 553, 558 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (quoting ProMax Dev. Corp. v.
Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct.App.1997). However, ambiguity requiring
admission of parol evidence of the parties intentions, "presents a question of fact."
Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 81, ^[26, 190 P.3d 1269, 1276 (citing Winegar v. Froerer,
813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991)). "This court reviews the trial court's findings of fact
for clear error, reversing only where the finding is against the clear weight of the

iv

evidence, or if we otherwise reach a firm conviction that a mistake has been made."
Covey v. Covey, 80 P.3d 553 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (quoting ProMax Dev. Corp. v.
Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct.App.1997).
Issue No, lb: Whether the district court committed reversible error in applying
the evidence to determine the intent of the parties and meaning of the Agreement
meant to be that Florence was entitled to the additional $90,000 if Defendant secured
the financing required to complete the purchase of the Property and the develop the
project?
"When ambiguity exists, the intent of the parties becomes a question of fact."
WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, ^22, 54 P.3d 1139, 1146
(quoting SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT
54, ^fl4, 28 P.3d 669). "This court reviews the trial court's findings of fact for clear
error, reversing only where the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, or
if we otherwise reach a firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Covey v.
Covey, 80 P.3d 553 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (quoting ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson,
943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct.App.1997)).
ISSUE NO, 2:

Whether the trial court erred in finding Colbert's

interpretation of the Agreement's terms to be reasonable and more consistent with the
language contained within the Agreement and the context surrounding its creation?
Questions of fact are reviewed for clear error and may be set aside only if
against the clear weight of the evidence. Dansie v. Hi-Country Estate Homeowners
Assoc, 92 P.3d 162 (Utah Ct. app. 2004). "In order to challenge a court's factual
v

findings, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and
then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support thefindingeven
when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." Sweet v. Sweet, 2006
UTApp216.

vi

ISSUES PRESERVED FOR APPEAL
Florence argued that the Agreement, the contract at issue in this case, was
ambiguous, requiring parole evidence, in his Memorandum in Opposition to Summary
Judgment. (R 78-82) Florence argued that "the meaning of the written agreement
between Casey Florence and Chad Colbert cannot be determined without resort to
parole evidence" in his Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the
Motion for Summary Judgment of Third Party Defendant Greg Young. (R 241-291)
At trial, in response to Colbert's counsel's oral motion for directed verdict, Florence's
counsel reminded to trial court of the two prior motions and stated "I think the court
was right the first two times and it is the law of this case that "closing" is not so clear
that we not need parol evidence to define it." (R 404; TR 57:1-5) Florence did not
object to the trial court's oral ruling that, as to terms such as "closing" and "project,"
the "terms of the agreement itself are unclear and parol evidence is required to
understand and interpret this contract for what its true meaning is." (R 404; TR
59:17-23) Thus, Florence did not preserve the issues of the Agreement's ambiguity or
the trial court's need look to parol evidence to determine the intent of the parties and
the meaning of the Agreement.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
There are no determinative constitutional provisions or statutes.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition.
This case involves interpretation of a written agreement between the parties,

dated September 21, 2005 but signed September 22, 2005, wherein Florence agreed to
loan Colbert $90,000 and Colbert agreed to repay the original amount of $90,000
together with either "interest at a rate of 12% annually with a 3 point fee if the project
was not closed by October 24, 2005" or "plus an additional $90,000 (ninety thousand
dollars) if the borrowers close said project." (hereinafter the "Agreement"). Colbert
did not purchase the property but assigned the rights to purchase the property for a
profit. Colbert subsequently paid Florence $100,000, and Florence sued for additional
sums claimed due under the Agreement.
Following a bench trial held May 7, 2009, the district court entered its Ruling,
dismissing Florence's claim on August 10, 2009. Florence filed an appeal of the
district court's decision. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on December 17,
2009, for lack of jurisdiction because a final order was not entered by the district
court. Florence filed a motion for new trial, pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, requesting the district court either enter new findings of fact and
conclusions or law or hold a new trial, on the grounds that the evidence was
insufficient to justify the district court's decision and that the district court erred. On
March 29, 2010, the district court denied Florence's motion for new trial and entered
its Final Ruling. Florence now appeals the final order and decision of the district
court.
viii

At issue in this case is the interpretation and meaning of the parties'
Agreement, specifically whether Florence is owed additional monies under the
Agreement.

H.

Statement of Facts.
1.

In summer of 2005, Colbert identified an approximately 178 acre parcel

of property, on Carcher and Indiana, in or near Caldwell, Idaho and began
investigating and negotiating with the sellers and meeting with city engineers,
regarding the purchase of the parcel (hereinafter the "Property"). (R 404; TR 63)
2.

In August 2005, Colbert signed a Real Estate Purchase Contract

("REPC") for the Property, for which the sellers required letter demonstrating the
ability to fund the purchase of the property. (R 404; TR 64)
3.

Colbert entered into a business association with Young with the purpose

and intent of purchasing and developing the "Property. (R 404; TR 66)
4.

As the end of the diligence period approached, Colbert and Young

required additional funds for an earnest money deposit, a bridge loan, to secure the
right to purchase the Property. (R 404; TR 67)
5.

Young contacted Florence to borrow the additional funds for the earnest

money deposit. Subsequently, Young informed Colbert that a friend and business
partner of his (Florence) would be willing to lend the additional money needed for the
earnest money deposit. (R404; TR 10: 19-25; TR 67: 3-4)
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6.

Colbert then contacted Florence about borrowing the additional funds

for the earnest money deposit. (R 404; TR 68)
7.

Florence agreed to lend the sum of $90,000 00 to Colbert and Young for

the earnest money on the purchase of the Property on certain terms. This agreement
was memorialized in an Escrow Money Agreement ("Agreement") dated September
21, 2005 but signed September 22, 2005. (R 404; TR 27-29)
8.

The Agreement, in its entirety reads as follows:
Escrow money agreement entered into this 21st day of
September 2005
On Property at 1788 Highway 95 Council ID, 83612 Parcel
# R3283900000
This escrow money agreement between Cad Colbert &
Greg Young ("the borrowers") and Casey Florence ("the
lender") is for $90,000 ninety thousand dollars.
Terms:
Chad Colbert & Greg Young, jointly and severally promise
to pay the original amount of $90,000 together with
interest at a rate of 12% annually with a 3 point fee if the
project is not closed by October 24, 2005 which date is the
agreed repayment date. If borrowers close said project,
borrowers agree to pay the lender this original loan amount
plus an additionally $90,000 (ninety thousand dollars),
payable 14 days after closing.
Chad Colbert
Greg Young
Casey Florence

9.

Despite reference to Young and a line for Young's signature, the

Agreement was signed only by Colbert and Florence. Florence did not send the
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Agreement to Young or seek his signature, because he was his friend and business
partner. (R 404; TR 30-31)
10.

The Agreement indicates that the funds are for "Property at 1788

Highway 95 Council ID, 83612 Parcel # R3283900000." However, it is undisputed
neither of the parties are familiar with this property and that the funds were provided
for a REPC for the purchase of the Property in Caldwell, Idaho. (R 514-524; R 404;
TR81)
11.

On September 22, 2005, Florence wired the $90,000 into an Idaho

escrow account. (R 404; TR 17)
12.

From August 2005 through October 2005, Colbert worked toward

developing the Property, meeting with city officials from Caldwell, Idaho, Kevin
Harris, a planning engineer with Briggs Engineering, and Mike Priner, a manager for
Owahee Construction, concerning development of the Property. (R 404; TR 61-62,
71)
13.

By mid-October 2005, Colbert was unable to obtain financing for the

purchase and development of the Property and began looking for funding and other
options, in order to avoid losing the $100,000 earnest money and expenses in the
Property and development project. (R 404; TR 71)
14.

Colbert was introduced to Kevin Howell; he gave the preliminary

development work to Kevin Howell, and Kevin Howell made Colbert an offer for the
right to purchase the property. Colbert thereafter assigned the REPC to Howell-
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Murdoch Development Corporation, for a gross fee of $1,045,000. (R 404; TR 72,
87-88)
15.

Colbert did not purchase or closed on the purchase of the Property. (R

404;TR72)
16.

Howell-Murdoch Development Corporation closed on and purchased

the Property. (R404;TR77)
17.

After receiving funds for his assignment of his rights to purchase the

Property, Colbert wrote Florence a check for $100,000.00. (R 404; TR 80)
18.

On or about March 27, 2007, Florence filed suit against Colbert, and

only Colbert, seeking judgment in the amount of $80,000, plus interest against
Colbert, for sums allegedly due under the Agreement. (R 1-5)

xii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court correctly found that the express written language of the
parties' Agreement is sparse, lacked definitions of key terms, and subject to different
meanings and, thus, ambiguous as matter of law, requiring the court to look to
extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning and intent to the parties. The trial court
appropriately took extrinsic evidence concerning the parties' intent and applied the
evidence presented at trial and the principles of contract interpretation in making its
determination that Florence is not entitled to the additional monies he seeks because
Colbert did not "close on the project," within the meaning of the parties' Agreement.
The trial court's ruling is legally correct and supported by the evidence presented at
trial.
Florence also challenges certain findings in the district courts' Final Ruling.
Because Florence failed to adequately marshal the evidence, the Court should decline
to address this issue. More, as the district court correctly applied the law and the
evidence, the challengedfindingis both legally correct and supported by evidence at
trial, and the Court should not disturb the ruling below.

xiii

ARGUMENT
L

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INTERPRETING THE AGREEMENT.
The district court did not err in process or in substance in its interpretation of

the parties' Agreement. Indeed, the court correctly applied the law of contract.
The parties' core disagreement was whether additional monies were owed
Florence under the Agreement: a dispute about the meaning and interpretation of the
Agreement. See Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 2005 UT App 92, \ 12, 110
P.3d 168, 172 ("When parties to a contract disagree about the meaning of a provision,
principles of contract interpretation require [the Court] to give effect to the meaning
intended by the parties at the time they entered into the agreement.") (citing Central
Fla. Investments, Inc. v. ParkwestAssocs., 2002 UT 3,U 12, 40 P.3d 599). l After
noting the lack of context and definitions in the Agreement and considering relevant
parole evidence of the facts known to the parties at the time they entered the
Agreement, the district court appropriately found that the Agreement was ambiguous.
See Id. (citing Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, f 7, 78 P.3d 600) Concluding that
the Agreement was ambiguous, requiring extrinsic evidence to discern the intent of
the parties and the meaning of the contract, the court applied the evidence presented at
trial and the principles of contract interpretation to conclude that Florence was not
entitled to the additional monies sought, because Colbert did not "close on the

1

Brief of Appellant, pp. 5-6.
1

project," within the meaning of the parties' Agreement.2 See WebBank v. American
Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, f 22, 54 P.3d 1139 ("When ambiguity exists
[in a contract], the intent of the parties becomes a question of fact.11) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The trial court's ruling is both legally correct and
supported by the evidence presented at trial.
Nonetheless, Florence posits error with the trial court's ruling that he was not
entitled to additional monies because Colbert did not close on the project within the
meaning of the Agreement. In his general argument that the trial court committed
reversible error by failing to properly apply principles of contract construction,
Florence specifically contends that the trial court failed to construe the Agreement as
a whole, by ignoring and failing to explain or give effect to "either the deadline or
escrow language"4, by failing to assign his desired meaning to the disputed terms of
the Agreement5, and by rewriting the Agreement "to conform with what the court
might view as reasonable."6 In making these specific contentions and arguing for his
interpretation of the Agreement, Florence implies that the trial court erred in finding
the terms of the Agreement ambiguous and that the trial court committed reversible
error in weighing the evidence presented at trial in interpreting the Agreement.
Contrary to Florence's specific and implied contentions, the trial court properly
determined that the Agreement was ambiguous and accepted extrinsic evidence to
2

R 514-524; Final Ruling, pp. 9-10.
Brief of Appellant, pp. 5-6.
4
Id., pp. 6-8.
5
Id., pp. 8-11.
« Id., pp. 11-13.
3

2

determine the intent of parties. More, the trial court did not ignore language titling
the Agreement an escrow money agreement or contractual language concerning the
payment deadline or in applying the evidence to the disputed terms of the Agreement.
Finally, there is no support for Florence's contention that the trial court rewrote the
Agreement to its own view of reasonable. Indeed, this Court should find that the
district court's decision was legally correct and appropriately grounded in the
Agreement and the evidence presented at trial.
A.

The Written Agreement is Ambiguous.

The district court was correct in its determination that the parties' written
Agreement is ambiguous.
In its controlling 2008 decision, the Supreme Court reiterated that "[a]
contractual term or provision is ambiguous 'if it is capable of more than one
reasonable interpretation because of'uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or
other facial deficiencies." Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 81, |25, 190 P.3d 1269, 1275
(quoting WebBankv. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, f20, 54 P.3d 1139
(quoting SMEIndus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT
54, f 14, 28 P.3d 669)). This "contractual ambiguity can occur in two different
contexts: (1) facial ambiguity with regard to the language of the contract and (2)
ambiguity with regard to the intent of the contracting parties." Id. at ^[25, 190 P.30 at
1275-76 (citing Ward v. Intermountain Farmers A 'ssn9 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah
1995).

3

1.

The Agreement is facially ambiguous with regard to the
language of the contract.

The language of the Agreement is facially ambiguous. Facial ambiguity
"presents a question of law to be determined by the judge." Id. at ^25,190 P.30 at
1276 (citing WebBank, 2002 UT 88, f22, 54 P.3d 1139).
Here Florence does not challenge the trial court's determination of the
ambiguity the Agreement directly, and the finding that the Agreement is ambiguous is
consistent with the argument made by Florence in opposing two prior motions for
summary disposition and at trial. More, the facts and the terms of the Agreement
itself also support the conclusion that the Agreement is facially ambiguous.
Although the Agreement is brief8, it contains uncertain, undefined and
unapplied terms. In finding the Agreement ambiguous, the trial court found that
"[t]he terms 'project,5 'close,' and 'closing5 are not defined in the Agreement55 and
"that each term is subject to differing interpretations.5'9 As part of its consideration,
the trial court made other findings concerning irregularities and ambiguity in the
Agreement, which are not challenged on appeal10 Ultimately, the trial court correctly
concluded that "[bjecause the written agreement between the parties is sparse and
7

Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment (R 78-82, p 5); Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment of Third
Party Defendant Greg Young (R 241-291); and at trial. (R 404; TR 59:17-23)
8
The entire text of the Agreement contains fewer than 130 words.
9 R 404, Final Ruling, p 4, fk
10
The trial court found that "[d]espite references to Greg Young as a 'borrower,5 the
Agreement was entered into and signed only by Colbert and Florence.55 The trial
court also found that "[although the Agreement refers to property in Council,
Idaho, the parties agree and the Courtfindsthat the real property that was the
subject of the Agreement is located in Caldwell, Canyon County, Idaho5'
4

does not contain definitions of key terms, specifically 'project' and 'close,' . . . the
words used to express the intention of the parties are insufficient so that the
Agreement may be and was understood to have different meanings," obliging the
court to "look to parol evidence to determine the intent of the parties and the meaning
of the Agreement." (R 404, Final Ruling, p 9, «P).

2.

The Agreement is ambiguous as to the intent of the parties.

The Agreement is ambiguous as to the intent of the parties. Ambiguity
regarding intent of the parties "presents a question of fact where, if the judge
determines that the contract is facially ambiguous, 'parol evidence of the parties'
intentions should be admitted.',, Id. (quoting Winegar v. Froerer, 813 P.2d 104, 108
(Utah 1991)).
The trial court made substantial findings concerning the parties' understanding
and intent concerning the Agreement. However, the ambiguity of the Agreement as
to the intent of the parties is, perhaps, supported and illuminated best by the words of
Florence himself.
Under cross-examination during trial, Florence's elucidated his understanding
of the meaning of the Agreement, stating:
But I look at this deal as two different understandings.
One is if [Colbert] returned the earnest money, then
[Colbert] owed three points and interest on that amount of
money from the day I gave it to [Colbert] until the
October 24th. If it goes past October 24th, it's because
[Colbert] put together a deal and so now the clause kicks
in that [Colbert] owe[s] me $90,000. [Colbert] paid me
$10,000 of that 90. So, there is 80,000 still owed. So, it's
5

my belief and understanding that interest and fees, if
possible, would be accumulating on the $80,000.
(R. 404; TR 39-40). Generally, it is this interpretation which has been adopted and
argued by Florence. By contrast, the trial court heard a telephone conversation
between the parties - initiated and recorded by Florence prior to litigation, discovery
and preparation for trial - in which Florence succinctly summarized another
interpretation of the Agreement. In this conversation, Florence stated to Colbert:
Yeah. Because, basically, you know, the deal I had with
you guys is if you bought that property, you were going to
pay me back $90,000, you know, plus 90.
(R 404; TR 45:6-10; R 414-442, exhibit). It is this interpretation employed by Colbert
and, ultimately, adopted by the court.
It is undisputed that the Agreement contained terms with undefined meanings,
lacked terms, and suffered from other facial deficiencies. Nor is it disputed that, as a
result of its facial deficiencies the Agreement is and was subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation. Accordingly, the trial court's determination that the
Agreement was ambiguous was correct, as a matter of law, and it was appropriate for
the court to look extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties and the
meaning of the Agreement.
B.

The District Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error in Applying
the Evidence to Determine the Intent of the Parties and the
Meaning of the Agreement

The trial court did not err in applying the evidence to determine the intent of
the parties and the meaning of the Agreement. "When ambiguity exists, the intent of
6

the parties becomes a question of fact." WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp.,
2002 UT 88, ^22, 54 P.3d 1139, 1145 (quoting SMEIndus., Inc., 2001 UT 54 at f 14,
28 P.3d 669). This Court reviews "all findings of fact for clear error, granting the
district court great deference in its review of the evidence." Dansie v. Hi-Country
Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 2004 UT App 149,1f 7, 92 P.3d 162; see also Radman v.
Flanders Corp., 2007 UT App 351, f5, 172 P.3d 668 ("'If a contract is deemed
ambiguous, and the trial court allows extrinsic evidence of intent, interpretation of the
contract becomes a factual matter and our review is strictly limited.'" (quoting Nielsen
v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, f 6, 78 P.3d 600)).
Florence now contends that the trial court failed to construe the Agreement as a
whole. This contention is without merit.
1.

The trial court construed the Agreement as a whole.

Having correctly determined that the Agreement was ambiguous and that parol
evidence was required to determine the parties' intent and the meaning of the
Agreement, the trial court did not fail to construe the Agreement as a whole.
In support of his argument that the trial court failed to construe the Agreement
as a whole, Florence notes that "the written Agreement designates October 24, 2005
as the 'agreed repayment date,'" and that Florence loaned $90,000 which was used as
earnest money for a Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC"). He then,
inappropriately, attempts to bootstrap the terms of the REPC into his discussion of the
Agreement, ignoring that Florence was not a party to the REPC, that Florence's

7

testimony indicated that he had not read or seen the REPC at the time of the
Agreement and that the document contains information, such as the location of the
Property, that Florence testified he had "no way of knowing" about. (R 404; TR
39:24-25)
Continuing, Florence complains that the trial court's conclusion "allows
Colbert to pay only points and interest even though repaid after October 24 " and
does not "explain how or why this should be the case."11 However, this result is
consistent with the language of the Agreement werein Colbert's promise "to pay the
original amount of $90,000 together with interest at a rate of 12% annually with a 3
point fee if the project is not closed by October 24, 2005 which date is the agreed
repayment date," without explanation. Finally, despite specific mention of the interest
and repayment date, as well as findings that the Agreement was titled "Escrow
money agreement"13 and that Florence wired the money "into an Idaho escrow
account",14 in the district court's Findings of Fact, Florence protests the lack of
mention, in the Final Ruling, as to how these terms are to be understood.
While demonstrating a clear desire for a different outcome, Florence has not
shown that the trial court committed reversible error in interpreting the meaning of the
Agreement, and the Court should reject his assignment of error.

11

Brief of Appellant, p. 8.
12 Final Ruling, p 9, f2.
13 Final Ruling, p 3, f3.
14
Id., p 7,1fl0.
8

2.

The trial court did not err in applying the evidence to
determine the intent of the parties and the meaning of the
Agreement.

As the Agreement was ambiguous and parol evidence was required to
determine the parties' intent and the meaning of the Agreement, the trial court did not
commit clear error in determining that the Agreement entitled Florence to the
additional $90,000 if Colbert secured the financing required to complete the purchase
of the Property and the development of the project.
Florence also contends that the court's ruling restricts the meaning of the term
'closing' to exclude his recovery, arguing that "[njothing in the written agreement
eliminates this interpretation."15 The argument, offered in support of Florence's
position, highlights the ambiguity of the Agreement and focuses on Florence's
interpretation and preferred application of the term "closing." Florence also fails to
show how the adoption of a different definition of "closing" would bring a different
result.
Although couched as a question of the trial court's legal decision, Florence's
argument is a direct challenge of the court's factual determination concerning the
meaning. An assignment of error made without showing of clear error or the
marshalling required for such a challenge. C.f. Boyer v. Boyer, 2008 UT App. 138,
f21 ("In order to challenge a court's factual findings, an appellant must first marshal
all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is
legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most
15

Brief of Appellant, p 9.
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favorable to the court below.") (citing Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 76, 100 P.3d
1177; Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal
all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."). Accordingly, the Court
should reject Florence's assignment of error, as Florence has both failed to meet his
burden to shown that the trial court committed reversible error in the trial court's
interpretation of the Agreement and failed to marshall the evidence in support of the
trial court's determination(s).
Under the well-established rules and case law, "[i]n order to challenge a court's
factual findings, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the
finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the
finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." Boyer v.
Boyer, 2008 UT App. 138, f 21 (citing Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ^ 76, 100 P.3d
1177 (internal quotation marks omitted) and Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding."). Adequate marshalling requires appellant to "present... every
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings [she]
resists." Chen, 2004 UT at f 77, 100 P.3d 1177.
3.

Florence's allegation that the trial court inappropriately
rewrote the Agreement is without support.

Florence's allegation that the trial court rewrote the Agreement is without
support, so too is his assertion that "the contract provides that Florence stood to
double his money if not repaid by October 24th." In fact, the trial court found,
10

"Colbert's interpretation of the Agreement's terms reasonable and more consistent
with the language contained within the Agreement and the context surrounding its
creation," and that "the evidence supported Colbert's testimony because his action
were consistent with his stated intention of acquiring and developing the Property (the
project) and his stated understanding of the Agreement."16
Florence's direct challenge of the court's motives and factual determinations
are made without support, demonstration of clear error or the marshalling required.
Accordingly, the Court should reject Florence's argument and claim.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING COLBERT'S
INTERPRETATION OF THE AGREEMENT REASONABLE AND
MORE CONSISTENT WITH THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT AND
THE CONTEXT SURROUNDING ITS CREATION.
Florence argues that the district court erred in finding that Colbert's

interpretation of the Agreement's terms is reasonable and more consistent with the
language contained within the Agreement and the context surrounding its creation.
Florence bases his assignment of clear error on the trial's inclusion of Colbert's
testimony that "he entered the Agreement with Florence anticipating a typical "hard
money" lending arrangement in which he agreed to pay points and interest for a short
term loan."17
Because Florence has failed to meet the marshalling requirements for review of
findings of fact, the Court should decline to consider Florence's argument. Finally,

16
17

Final Ruling, p 7411.
Brief of Appellant, p 13; R 519: 6.
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the Court should not disturb the ruling below, because the trial court made appropriate
legal rulings and factual findings which are neither clearly erroneous nor a reversible.
A.

Florence Has Failed to Adequately Marshal the Evidence.

The Court should not address Florence's challenge to the trial court's finding
because he has failed to meet his marshalling requirement. Under the wellestablished case law and rules of this Court, "[i]n order to challenge a court's factual
findings, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and
then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even
when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." Boyer v. Boyer, 2008
UT App. 138, f 21 (citing Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, % 76, 100 P.3d 1177 (internal
quotation marks omitted) and Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding.").
Adequate marshalling requires appellant to "present... every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings [she] resists." Chen,
2004 UT at % 77, 100 P.3d 1177. Accordingly, in order to meet the marshalling
requirements to challenge the trial court's findings regarding the intent of the parties
and the interpretation of the parties' Agreement, he must compile and marshall all of
the evidence that supports the finding he wishes changed and demonstrate that the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court's findings. He has not done
that.
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Examples of Florence's evidence not marshalled include the following
evidence which support the trial court's finding:
1)

Florence' s own previously-discussed, pre-litigation recorded
statement, wherein Florence recounted an interpretation of the
parties' Agreement in line with Colbert's interpretation, saying,
"Yeah. Because, basically, you know, the deal I had with you
guys is if you bought that property, you were going to pay me
back $90,000, you know, plus 90." (R 404; TR 45: 6-10)

2)

Colbert's rejection of the advances of Peterson Development to
purchase the rights to acquire the Property so that he could
realize the profits from developing the project himself. (R 404;
TR 89-90)

3)

Florence's failure to send the Agreement to or obtain the
signature of his business partner, Greg Young, on the Agreement,
despite Young being identified as a party to the Agreement. (R
404; TR 30: 6-8)

4)

Florence's broad definition of the Agreement term "project" to
mean "to tie up that property to give them the opportunity to
develop it, to flip it at the worst case scenario, to do something
with it to make money beyond the date of October 24th." (R 404;
TR33:l-5)
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5)

Colbert's testimony that when he wrote the $ 100,000 check to
Florence he did not believe that additional monies were owed.
(R 404, TR 80: 17-19)

6)

Colbert's testimony that he would not have purchased the
Property if he did not also have funds to develop it. (R 404; TR
71:4-6)

7)

Colbert's description of the monies obtained through the parties'
Agreement as a bridge loan. (R 414; TR 66: 24-25; 74: 6-8)

8)

The Agreement (R 414-442: 13).

Florence's failure to marshall and identify extends to much of the information
identified in the trial court's findings, such as the descript of the loan as a "bridge
loan," Colbert's claim that he did not discuss or consider "flipping" the Property at
the time of the Agreement, and Colbert's testimony that he believed he would owe
Florence the additional $90,000 when he closed on and took possession of the
Property. Indeed, Florence fails to marshall the very statement concerning "hard
money" to which he attributes significant weigh. Rather than identify the source of
the finding and marshall the evidence, Florence mischaracterizes the statement , and

18

Colbert's testimony concerning the "hard money" nature of the loan is as follows:
"Um, the 12 percent and three points interest rate was kind of a hard money loan kind
of rate, and that we would be triggered into paying that money on that date." (R 414;
TR 67:21-24)
14

submits a Wikipedia definition into the footnotes, with the claim that the "definition
disqualifies Colbert's claim."19
More, even where Florence identifies evidence which supports the trial court's
finding, such as Colbert's testimony as to his understanding of the meaning of closing
on the project, he fails to demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support the trial court's finding. 20
Here, while Florence has presented some evidence in support of the trial
court's ruling, he has not met his marshalling burden. Instead, while citing to pieces
of the record which support the trial court'sfinding,Florence has focused on
rearguing his own position and interpretation of the contract. In short, Florence has
failed to marshal the evidence presented to the Court in support of the challenged
language, and, as a consequence, this Court should decline to entertain his challenge
to the court's findings.
B,

The Trial Court's Ruling Should Not Be Disturbed.

The Court should not disturb the ruling below. The trial court made the
appropriate legal rulings concerning the ambiguity of the parties Agreement, took
appropriate extrinsic evidence, weighed the evidence, and made thoughtful
determinations concerning the intent of the parties and the meaning of the Agreement,
which determinations were based upon the evidence presented and made according to

19

Brief of Appellant, p 16.

20

Florence even fails to fully or develop develop the "fatal flaw" in the trial court's ruling. Brief of Appellant,
pp 16-17.
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controlling law of contract interpretation. Accordingly, as the challenged finding is
both correct and in accord with weight of the evidence and as Florence did not meet
his marshalling burden or preserve the issue for appeal below, the Court should not
disturb the ruling below. See Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, f30, 112 P.3d 495.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not err in process or in substance in its interpretation of
the parties' Agreement. The court correctly applied the law of contract interpretation
in construing the Agreement and appropriately weighed the evidence and applied it to
the law and the express terms of the Agreement. The Court should not address
Florence's assignments of error, he has failed meet his burden to marshal.
Accordingly and for the reasons set forth above, the Utah Court of Appeals should
affirm the district court's ruling.

Dated this 20th day of October 2010.

PRANNO ASHWORTH LAW, PLLC

Justin T. AshwortlT"
Attorney for Defendant /Appellee
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